Lucila G. Alvarez-Zuzek et.al.

2412.16121v1

As humans perceive and actively engage with the world, we adjust our decisions in response to shifting group dynamics and are influenced by social interactions. This study aims to identify which aspects of interaction affect cooperation-defection choices. Specifically, we investigate human cooperation within the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, using the Drift-Diffusion Model to describe the decision-making process. We introduce a novel Bayesian model for the evolution of the model’s parameters based on the nature of interactions experienced with other players. This approach enables us to predict the evolution of the population’s expected cooperation rate. We successfully validate our model using an unseen test dataset and apply it to explore three strategic scenarios: co-player manipulation, use of rewards and punishments, and time pressure. These results support the potential of our model as a foundational tool for developing and testing strategies aimed at enhancing cooperation, ultimately contributing to societal welfare.

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